Residential Community Associations (RCAs) are quick becoming a common but controversial feature of the housing market. Supporters of RCAs point to the rapid growth as a clear sign of their success in improving upon market failures. RCAs provide additional restrictions that can limit neighborhood externalities and reduce future consumption risk. However, critics contend that RCAs create additional conflicts and push problems into other neighborhoods. Previous published empirical work on the impact of RCA zoning has been limited in institutional detail and has not corrected for spatial autocorrelation. This paper uses 1,487 single-family sales in 2000 from Greeley, Colorado and a unique dataset that includes information on RCAs' various use restrictions, building restrictions, and voting rules to investigate the impact of private zoning on the housing market. A spatially corrected semi-log hedonic model is employed to estimate the marginal price impacts. The main model of interest finds that building restrictions no impact on prices, while use restrictions increase prices. Furthermore, the optimal voting decision rule is at an 80 percent supermajority but voting rights to first mortgage holders significantly reduces prices.
to the sale price; second, RCAs vary in their impact with some associated with substantial price premiums others are associated with price discounts; and finally, building restrictions provide no impact on prices and use restrictions increase prices. Furthermore, the optimal voting decision rule is at an 80 percent supermajority but voting rights to first mortgage holders significantly reduces prices.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts. The next section provides a brief introduction into RCAs, which is followed by a literature review. Since this study uses a unique dataset, the data portion of the paper large and detailed. The final two sections summarize the regression model and results.
RCAs, Restrictions, and Risk
Ronald Coase's 1960 work, The Problem of Social Costs, provides the very familiar framework for when one can expect externalities to be a problem. Externalities in a world of zero transaction costs and fully defined property rights will be internalized through market transactions. However, both a lack of defined property rights and the existence of transaction costs will inhibit efficiency.
Human beings have been dealing with this reality for quite some time and have created various organizations in part to deal with these externalities. National governments and multinational corporations are two sophisticated examples but RCAs, while somewhat more humble, are also.
RCAs will attempt to promote efficiency by clarifying and arranging property rights.
Negative externalities can be mitigated by removing some of the right to use one's own property and transferring it to the neighbors. For example, in many RCAs, you do not have the right to use your front lawn as a parking lot without the express consent of your neighbors, and because there are significant transaction costs associated with organizing your neighbors to agree on an arrangement, you simply do not bother. This is an example of an efficient outcome if your willingness to pay is less than the sum of the neighbors' willingness to accept. Furthermore, residents who prefer to have more control over personal property and care less about the actions of neighbors will be less like to move to the restrictive RCA. Therefore, RCAs are able reduce the negative effects of externalities by adjusting property rights and providing signals to potential buyers.
Of course zoning boards are given responsibility to do reduce externalities through a similar process.
3 Still, RCAs may have an informational advantage over municipal boards because of a small size and more flexibility in its institutional formation.
Previous Empirical Work
The previous empirical work on RCAs and restrictions 4 are limited to Speyrer (1989) , Cannaday (1994) , and Hughes and Turnbull (1996a) . All three studies use a hedonic regression to examine the effects of covenants and find statistically and economically significant impacts, but each study includes some subtle differences. Speyrer and Hughes and Turnbull use an expected utility model where Speyrer demonstrates the impact of risk and restriction on hedonic bid functions and Hughes and Turnbull model the impact of consumption risk on hedonic prices.
Cannaday models the benefits of covenants by modeling a negative externality in pet ownership.
To build his model Roger Cannaday assumes that condominium owners gain utility from pet ownership but lose utility from neighbors' pets. In other words, pet owners will have a net positive gain from ownership but will bear only the costs of neighbors' pets. If each condo owner decides the number of pets to own individually, too many pets will be owned because of the negative externality of pet ownership and if transaction costs are relatively high then a suboptimal, but stable, equilibrium will exist. To improve efficiency Cannaday posits "[s]uch negotiations may occur through the auspices of an ownership association 5 ."
Cannaday does not, however, study the negotiations of condo owners but rather he collects the restrictive covenants for the condominiums. Cannaday uses 1,061 sales of 13 multifamily condominiums in Chicago from 1988 through September 1991. He finds four categories of pet restrictions, "no pets," "cats only," "small pets including dogs," and large pets including dogs," where the restrictions are ordered from most restrictive to least restrictive. The results of the hedonic regression show an optimal restriction level at "cats only," which adds about 5.6 percent to the condominium price while "small pets" and "large pets" reduce the price by about 5.8 and 11.5 percent respectively 6 . Clearly these are large results; with an average sales price of almost $80,000 the choice of restriction level could change sales price by $4,400 to -$9,200.
3 See Fischel (1985) for an excellent examination of zoning through a property rights approach. 4 For empirical work on RCAs and public goods see Langbein and Spotswood-Bright (2004) . 5 Cannaday (1994, p 74) 6 See Table 3 of Cannaday (1994, p 80) Hughes and Turnbull also use an expected utility model also, save the opportunity cost of the land-use restrictions. Their model focuses on consumption risk and concludes that under risk aversion house prices will be higher with less variance of possible future neighborhood conditions. Therefore RCAs with "stricter covenants or with stricter enforcement maintained or signaled credibility to potential residents will 8 " have lower consumption risk and thus command higher prices.
Hughes and Turnbull are unable to measure enforcement but they are able record the restrictions created by the RCAs. They use 1,314 single-family house sales in Baton Rouge, Louisiana from 1985 through 1992. Their covenant data includes the age of the subdivision, seven specific restrictions, and a strictness index which counts the number of restrictions "plus statements of specific deed restriction enforcement criteria and sewer hookup restrictions, 9 " and an interaction term with strictness and age of the subdivision. To test the hypothesis four models are presented.
The coefficient on age of the subdivision, which was included in the last three models, was positive or negative depending on the model. The coefficients on individual restrictions were used in model two but collectively produced positive, negative, significant, and 7 See Table 2 of Speyrer (1989, p 125) 8 Hughes and Turnbull (1996a, p 165) 9 Hughes and Turnbull (1996a, p 170) insignificant signs. The authors conclude that individual restrictions are likely beset with collinearity issues, which arise from "imperfect hierarchy structures 10 ."
The last two coefficients prove to be inline with expectations; both the strictness index and the interaction term are significant in models three and four, with a positive sign on the former and a negative sign on the latter. Using their fourth model and evaluating at the means, Hughes and Turnbull estimate the net increase in house price was about 6 percent for a 10 yearold subdivision and about 2 percent for a 20 year-old subdivision 11 .
The current economic literature is in agreement that, on average, the restrictive covenants do add value residents by reducing the risk of future externalities. For single-family housing, the estimates range from 2 to 8 percent. However, Cannaday's study suggests that an optimal level of restrictiveness may exist and some developers have regulated beyond. This implies that not all RCAs are improving housing prices. Furthermore, covenants can be change in the future by amendments or termination. Therefore, the restrictiveness of the covenant will be affected by the voting rules.
The motivation of this study is to expand the empirical literature by providing more institutional detail about RCA restrictiveness; I will differentiate between use and building restrictions and include voting rules.
Data
The data is a set of 1,487 single-family house sales and RCAs from Greeley, Colorado in 2000. Greeley, at about 80,000 residents, is the largest town in Weld County. The single-family sales, including sale price, housing characteristics, and GIS data was gathered from Weld County Assessors Office and Weld County GIS. All sales were limited to a price range between $50,000
and $500,000 in order to reduce the issue of unlivable house sales or non-arms-length transactions and to remove houses in the upper market.
[Insert Table 1 house sales were apart of a RCA. The distance variables are measured in 100s of yards and were generated using a GIS mapping of Greeley. Rather than estimate the distance of a house from the center of an object, the technique used 25 yard bands that surrounded each of the four objects, which is illustrated in figure 1 . The advantage to using bands is that it is better able to deal with object that deviate significantly from a circle. For example the CBD in Greeley is spread along the major road arteries and not in the center of Greeley. The variable CBD Dist measures the distance to an employment area in Greeley but since the CBD and the main road arteries are highly correlated it also measures the distance to a major road artery. The remaining RCA variables are discussed below.
Covenants in Weld County, Colorado
The scope of this paper is limited to the study of how covenants are used to organize neighborhoods; however, covenants are used to accomplish a broad range of goals. Covenants have been filed in Weld County to restrict the sale date and buyer of a house. Habitat for Humanity, for example, restricts when a recipient of a house may sell or how they may use the said house. Some covenants restrict water rights as to irrigation or limit grazing practices. Other covenants require rent control on property or limit future filing of legal suits pertaining to the said property.
Covenants which cover multiple housing units vary in detail and scope from one page documents which must be completely enforced by the civil courts to 120 page documents with several self regulating agents (the homeowner association). Still, there are eight characteristics that can be categorized: use restrictions, architectural restrictions, easements, bureaucratic organization, assessments, developer's rights, mortgagee's rights, and amendment and termination. Not every covenant has all eight characteristics; some only have two
The State of Colorado does include some minor regulation of RCAs. The Colorado
Common Interest Ownership Act (2000) was designed with the recognition that "economic prosperity of Colorado is dependent upon the strengthening of homeowner associations in common interest communities…" Much of the legislation of the Act is valid "unless otherwise provided by the declarant," which makes most HOA organizations legally defendable and leads to some interesting points to make note of.
First, courts may find the covenant "unconscionable" at the time it was made and therefore unenforceable. Ellickson (1982) argues that courts are more rigorous in examination of covenants than they are for zoning code. However, while the Act is not adding any additional restrictions, it does clarify what cannot be considered sufficient evidence of an "unconscionable" contract.
Secondly, the Act does provide some protection from local governments. Municipal zoning cannot impose additional structure requirements on HOA units that it would not apply on other units. Eminent domain must also be sensitive to property with common interests. If any unit is acquired by eminent domain the compensation must include the unit's allocated interests.
Finally, small HOAs have a cap, which is adjusted to inflation, of $400 for the average annual common expense liability. This does not include insurance premiums or optional user fees.
Voting Rights and Amendments
All residents of a city or county over the age of 18 are given one vote to cast in any election. This is of course true regardless of owning property in the jurisdiction and is protected by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the US Constitution in the Avery decision 12 . By contrast, to be a voting member of the development with a covenant a person must own or have a direct economic interest in property in the development. Depending on the condition of the development and the nature of the covenant, homeowners, developers, and first mortgage holders can all be voting members in the development. The voting membership is not given to each individual. Rather the voting power is divided by the economic interest in the development, much like a corporation. Barzel and Sass (1990) Developing a subdivision is not a quick process. Developers will sell some completed homes in the subdivision while they continue construction on other homes and property. Risk on this investment increases with time. Therefore, the developer will desire to shorten the development time and maintain property values of the neighborhood until all the homes are sold.
In most Weld County covenants the developer holds voting and direct amendment rights until a specified number of lots are sold and/or a specified period of time has passed. In every contract where the developer held voting rights, three votes were assigned to every lot still owned by the developer.
First mortgage holders also shoulder risk and hold an economic interest in the value of the development. Many covenants are written with the first mortgage holders in mind. Some covenants require all first mortgage holders be given notice of any amendments or termination of the covenant and notice of any changes to the common areas (if any exist). Furthermore, all financial and general meeting records must be presented to the first mortgage holder upon request.
Other covenants give the first mortgage 13 holders voting rights. In every covenant which gives first mortgage holders voting rights, the voting requirements are held separate from the homeowner/developer voting. This does not mean that the homeowners lose their voting rights if they mortgage their homes. Rather the practice is akin to a federal bill passing both the House and the Senate before approval. For example, to pass an amendment a covenant may require 67 percent of the homeowners' votes and 51 percent of the first mortgage holders' votes.
Regression Model
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The choice of functional form is often a difficult one and the hedonic valuation literature offers little guide to a specific functional form. The hedonic price method does attempt to estimate the marginal prices of each house characteristic using the market price, which simultaneously is affected by supply and demand. Economic theory does make clear that the hedonic model should include a full set of all significant determinates of the housing price, i.e.
variables that are costly to produce and which provide benefit to the buyer (Bowen et al 2001) .
Economic theory also does predict these supply and demand functions should come from nonlinear relationships. Therefore, the functional form should be able to deal with non-linear relationships (Rosen 1974 ) and interactions of the independent variables (Bryan and Colwell 1982) . Furthermore logarithmic forms can reduce or eliminate estimation issues that are associated with heteroskedasiticity (Dubin 1998) . Given that OLS is a common and well understood tool, the semi-log model, where the natural log of the sales price is regressed on the dependent variables, is most commonly used in the literature. However, some authors do report multiple functional forms.
Both Speyrer (1989) and Hughes and Turnbull (1996a) use a log-linear function regressing the natural log of the sales prices on the housing characteristics. Speyrer's defense of the functional form is straightforward: the semi-log function allows for the independent coefficients to vary with the price of the house because the coefficients can be converted into a percent of sales price. Therefore, she argues, an automatic adjustment is made for the expected improved quality at higher prices. Only the percentage contribution of each characteristic must remain constant. Speyrer also estimated linear functions but does not report them because they are "less satisfactory either theoretically or with respect to the overall fit."
Hughes and Turnbull do not explicitly defend their chosen functional form; rather they cite Witte et al (1979) and Palmquist (1984) for a general summary of the hedonic theory.
Neither Witte et al or Palmquist provide any theoretical direction for a specific functional form.
Palmquist tested four functional forms 15 and chose the best fit using standard econometric techniques.
Cannaday (1994) uses a double-log form suggested by Bryan and Colwell (1982) . The main advantage of the double-log, Bryan and Colwell argue, is generally its ability to deal with a concave hedonic price function. Specifically, it can handle with ease both nonzero cross partial derivatives and nonzero second partial derivatives. Semi-log and linear functions do not allow for negative second partial derivatives without some transformation of the independent variables.
Linear and semi-log functions are still used in the current literature, notwithstanding the above criticism. One drawback of the double-log function is that it is difficult to interpret the marginal prices of the transformed variables. (Bastian et al, 2002 and Bowen et al 2001) The coefficient produced by OLS estimation is the marginal effect of the transformed independent variable on the transformed price variable. This interpretability problem has encouraged some researchers to report several functional forms or limit the forms to linear and/or semi-log.
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This study employs the use of a semi-log form given by the function,
where lnY is the natural log of the sales price, β H , β L , and β RCA are the sets of housing, locational, and RCA characteristics.
Before the hedonic model is complete corrections for spatial dependence must be addressed. The real estate market is Autocorrelation is a violation of the classical linear model that is normally found in the time series literature. The violation is one where the error term of one observation is related to another. For example, if the error of one observation in a time series model is related to the error in past observations, then the estimation of standard errors will not be efficient.
In this case, the classical linear model is still unbiased but it is not producing the minimum variance among unbiased estimators (i.e. it is no longer BLUE). The estimated residual variance is likely to be underestimated, which will mean the R 2 is overestimated. Still, One commonly used test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation is the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Anselin, 1988b) , which uses the residuals from a least-squared regression and the spatial weight matrix. The test is represented by
where e is the residuals of the least-squares regression and .* denotes the element by element matrix multiplication 17 .
This leaves only the question of the spatial weight. The weight should mimic the processes in which the spatial dependence is generated. In the housing market is created in part by real estate agents (and general buying and selling behavior) and their use of comparable house 17 The Lagrange Multiplier values in the regression are listed on tables 2 through 4.
sales. The weight used is a standardized nearest neighbor weight outlined in Anselin (1988) 18 .
Several neighbor weights were use, including a distance decay, however they did not have a large effect on the results and the 10 nearest neighbor consistently produced the highest LM value.
Results
Four models are presented to examine the effects of covenants on housing prices. The [Insert Table 2 here]
Model 2 includes the RCA dummy variable, which is significant at the 5 percent level in both the spatial and non-spatial. The economic significance is between about 2 and 3 percent or between about $2,950 and $4,450 evaluated at the mean sales price. The RCA result in Greeley is therefore at the low end of previous estimates.
Model 3 replaces the single RCA dummy with 28 separate dummies for each RCA greater than 25 houses. The 29 th dummy includes all RCAs with less than 25 houses. Table 4 reports the results of the RCA dummies and the descriptive statistics. The mean and standard deviation is of each variable and the entire dataset, while the last column reports the number of sales as a percent of total housing stock in each RCA.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In the non-spatial model 3 only 12 of the 29 variables are significant at the 10 percent level and 7 signs are negative, although only one RCA is significantly negative. The spatial correction moves two RCAs out of significance and two more in for a net of 12 RCAs significant at the 10 percent level. There are still 7 negative variables although two are now significant.
The 12 significant variables in the spatially corrected model are presented in figure 2. Of the significant coefficients, two stand out as unexpectedly large. Cambridge Glen and Foxhill are associated with about a 45 and 37 percent increase in price respectively and the spatial correction only strengthens the results to 51 and 36 percent respectively! These estimates must be met with caution for two reasons; first RCAs not only provide restrictions but also provide public goods, secondly each subdivision may have several unobservable factors associated with the construction or location that has not been controlled for.
[Insert Figure 2 here] Model 4 in table 5 presents the main thrust of the paper. The four main RCA variables, Vote Rule, Mort Vote, Build R, and Use R were all tested with a quadratic pair; however, only the Vote Rule pair was significant. The RCA variables are grouped into voting rules and restrictions. The restrictions provide specific details about the use and building limitations however all of these restrictions can be changed in the future and thus the voting rules will determine the difficulty of changing rules.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The first RCA group is Vote Rule, Vote 2 , and Mort Vote; all three are significant at the 5 percent level in both the spatial and non-spatial version. Vote Rule and its quadratic pair have a optimal pattern that supports the optimal model of Speyrer (1989) . The optimal voting rule is about 80 percent of lots. The dummy for first mortgage holders' voting rights is negative and significant both statistically and economically with about a 3 to 4 percent decline in price. The negative sign may indicate that while homeowners do value credible restrictions, they may be wary of "outsiders" restricting their decision to make changes. In fact many critical observers of RCAs believe the main reason for the growth of RCAs is a drive to be isolated into small conclaves. Still, one would presume that the negative impact of mortgage voting would be reduced if mortgage companies provide large enough discounts for the right to vote.
The second RCA group is Build R and Use R; both are significant at the 5 percent level in the non-spatial but only Use R remains significant in the spatial version. Building restrictions holds a negative sign in both versions, which is unexpected. The spatially corrected version suggests that the coefficient is indiscernible from zero, in which case it is reasonable to assume that either homeowners do not expect many problems to arise from construction or that the RCA's architectural committee are given broad authority and therefore the number of building The total effect of RCAs' institutional characteristics, evaluated at the means and using the spatially corrected version, is 3.1 percent or about $4,600 with mortgagee voting and 6.2 percent or about $9,200 without.
Conclusion
Residential community associations (RCAs) are growing rapidly in the housing market; some are being developed in unincorporated areas and others, probably the majority are being developed within municipalities. One of the functions they provide is zoning. The rapid growth of RCAs not only implies that they are adding value but also that municipalities are not zoning as completely as homeowners would like.
RCAs are in an advantageous informational position to provide zoning for local externalities because they often are dealing with fewer homeowners than an entire municipality These results provide additional detail of RCA institutional characteristics and one step closer to a side-by-side comparison of RCAs and municipalities. However there are three limitations to this study. First, like the previous work, this dataset is limited to one housing market. A national study would require enormous effort. Second, while covenants do provide restrictions and signs to potential buyers, they do not guarantee an adequate measure of restrictiveness, which would require a measure of enforcement. Finally, RCAs also provide public goods and however, this study does not explicitly control for public good provision and the fees collected. I leave these issues for future study. 
